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ABSTRACT 
We use a panel of OECD countries to gauge the relevance of the relative size 
of the youth population, labour market institutions and macroeconomic 
shocks at explaining observed relative youth unemployment rates. We find 
that the fluctuations of the youth population size caused by the baby boom 
of the 1950s and 1960s and the subsequent decline of fertility in many 
European countries are positively associated with fluctuations in relative 
y o u t h  u n e m p l o y m e n t  r a t e s .  W e  a l s o  f i n d  t h a t  s o m e  l a b o u r  m a r k e t  
institutions contribute to increase youth unemployment, and that the 
adjustment to macroeconomic shocks has affected relatively more to young 
workers than to adult workers. To motivate the effects of institutions on the 
relative unemployment rate of young workers, we lay out a simple theoretical 
model that builds on the imperfect substitutability of workers of different 
ages, and on the non-allocative role of (age specific) wages. 
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The performance of the European economies in terms of unemployment rates
has been in general dismal since the 1970s. Some signi￿cant improvements have
only been seen in the recent years. Even within the EU there are some cross-
country diﬀerences in the incidence of unemployment, which are more notice-
able when unemployment rates are observed for particular demographic groups.
While the unemployment rate of the prime age male workers has in most coun-
tries ￿uctuated around generally moderate average rates, those of the youth have
￿uctuated quite widely around considerably higher average rates. Therefore, a
thorough understanding of the dismal performance of European labour markets
should comprise an analysis of youth unemployment. Meanwhile, other moti-
vations to study youth labour markets should not be discounted. First, the
disaggregate analysis of unemployment across demographic groups might shed
light on the precise workings of labour market institutions. Second, the analy-
sis of youth unemployment could pave the way for the design of policies aimed
at improving overall labour market performance. The bene￿cial eﬀects of such
reforms can hardly be exaggerated, as it has been well established by now that
high youth unemployment rates have signi￿cant detrimental eﬀects in factors that
aﬀect welfare in the longer term, like human capital accumulation and fertility
rates.
This paper reviews the main factors explaining the unemployment rates of
the youth. For this, we develop an analytical framework which suggests that
to obtain a labour market equilibrium with broadly similar unemployment rates
for prime age and young workers, a certain degree of wage ￿exibility must exist.
In particular, two institutional characteristics would seem to be associated with
high relative youth unemployment rates. First, those that have a positive impact
on the overall cost of the standard labour contract (e.g. employment protection,
a higher tax wedge, etc.) are likely to make young workers less attractive for
￿rms, since given the average lower job experience of young workers their average
productivity tends to be lower. Second, an instititutional setting that does not
make provision for some contractual ￿exibility for the particular characteristics
of the young workers (e.g. age-speci￿c minimum wages, age-speci￿c ￿scal treat-
ment) would leave the youth in disadvantage relative to more experienced prime
age workers, if the general labour market setting is predominantly rigid.
The empirical results in the paper broadly con￿rm the insights in the theo-
retical part. Our main results follow the approach successfully implemented by
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) to study aggregate unemployment rates in OECD
countries. This approach focuses primarily in the interaction of macroeconomic
shocks and labour market institutions to account for countries unemployment
performance. We implement this approach in a panel of OECD countries, to
measure the joint eﬀect of macroeconomic shocks, labour market institutions and
1demographic developments to explain the (gender speci￿c) youth relative unem-
ployment rates (i.e. the diﬀerence between the youth unemployment rates -of
men and women, respectively- and that of prime age male workers). The leading
results indicate that -once the main relevant factors have been taken into account-
demographic developments have a signi￿cant, albeit limited, impact on relative
youth unemployment rates. In addition, it would appear that youth workers
tend to play a role of a ￿buﬀer￿ to absorb macroeconomic shocks, through wider
￿uctuations in their unemployment rates. This is re￿e c t e di nt h ev e r ys i g n i ￿cant
impact of cyclically-related variables in the relative youth unemployment rates
(i.e. weaker activity along the economic cycle would have a strong impact on
relative youth unemployment). Furthermore, this is re￿e c t e di nt h ef a c tt h a t
cyclical variables seem to have a markedly stronger eﬀects at higher (annual)
frequencies than at lower (￿ve year) frequencies. In addition, and in line with
our model, we ￿nd that institutional settings that increase the overall rigidity
of the labour market tend to increase the youth unemployment rate, and that
speci￿c institutional features that particularly reduce the restrictions aﬀecting
the youth labour markets (e.g. youth speci￿c -lower- minimum wages, or lower
strictness in temporary contractual forms) tend to somewhat reduce the relative
youth unemployment rate.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
One of the main socioeconomic developments which has signi￿cantly challenged
macroeconomists and labour economists in the last quarter of the 20th century
is the rise in unemployment and its persistence at historically very high levels.
Economists have been puzzled not only by the strikingly contrasting evolution
of unemployment rates in the US, the EU and Japan, but also by signi￿cant
diﬀerences across EU countries. The European unemployment experiences during
the last quarter of the 20th Century are indeed markedly diverse. They range from
the ￿success￿ stories of the Netherlands and the UK, which were able to revert the
increase of unemployment after the mid-1980s (see Nickell and van Ours, 2000),
to the partial success of Scandinavian countries, which with exception of the
early 1990s were able to maintain relatively low unemployment rates, and ￿nally
to ￿failure￿ stories like, for instance, Spain, which sustained unemployment rates
close to 20% during the 1980s and ￿rst half of the 1990s, although it has witnessed
substantial progress in the ￿ght against unemployment in the second half of the
1990s.
M a n yp a p e r sa n dm u c he m p i r i c a le ﬀort have been devoted at explaining the
causes of unemployment and its variability across countries and regions. The ￿rst
v i n t a g eo fp a p e r si nt h i sb r a n c ho ft h el i t e r a t u r eu s e dc r o s s - s e c t i o n a lo rp o o l e d
cross-sectional data on indicators of labour market performance and labour mar-
ket institutions to account for unemployment diﬀerentials across countries (see
Scarpetta, 1996, Nickell and Layard, 1999, Belot and van Ours, 2000). Recently,
this literature has evolved into a new vintage of papers which try to explain un-
employment diﬀerentials across countries by the interactions of macroeconomic
shocks and labour market institutions (see Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000, and
Bertola, Blau, and Kahn, 2002).1
There is another dimension of European unemployment which has received
less attention in the macroeconomic literature, namely, the diﬀerent incidence of
unemployment and non-employment across gender and age population groups.2
For instance, when comparing the EU and the US, it is the lower employment
rates (higher unemployment rates) of youth, unskilled adult women, and workers
1There are also papers showing that, even within EU countries, labour market institutions
seem to have diﬀerent eﬀects across regions creating persistent regional unemployment diﬀer-
entials (see Jimeno and Bentolila 1998, and Brunello et al., 2001).
2Nonetheless, there have been many reports and conferences on the causes of youth and fe-
male unemployment, which are not very much cited in the literature about the macroeconomics
of unemployment. See, for instance, the conferences and subsequent publications sponsored by
the NBER, such as The Youth Labor Market Problem, 1982; The Black Youth Employment
Crisis, 1986; Training and the Private Sector, 1994; Youth Employment and Joblessness in
Advanced Countries, 2000, and by the OECD, such as Youth Unemployment, 1978; The OECD
Jobs Study, 1994; Employment Outlook, 1986, 1996, 1998, 1999, and From Initial Education to
Working Life. Making Transition Works, 2000.
3aged 55-64 what explains the main bulk of the diﬀerences in aggregate employ-
ment and unemployment rates (see Dolado, Felgueroso, and Jimeno, 2001). Even
within the EU, there is a clear division between the Nordic countries, where the
gaps between female and youth unemployment rates and the aggregate ones are
relatively small, and the Southern countries, where female and youth unemploy-
ment rates have been persistently at much higher levels than those of prime aged
men. While it seems plausible that the lower employment rate of workers above
55 years of age is primarily the result of early retirement provisions rather than
of any other labour market institutions (see Gruber and Wise, 1998), the unem-
ployment rates of young, unskilled workers are most aﬀected by labour market
institutions which impose some kind of wage ￿oors (like minimum wages, collec-
tive bargaining, employment protection legislation, unemployment bene￿ts, and
so on). As stressed by Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2002) many labour market in-
stitutions have stronger and more clear cut implications for the distribution of
wages than for the level of the average w a g e ,a n d ,h e n c e ,f o rt h ec o m p o s i t i o no f
employment and the incidence of unemployment across population groups with
diﬀerent levels of productivity.
The incidence of youth unemployment has been related to the eﬀectiveness
of the educational system at easing the transition from school to work (see, for
instance, OECD, 2000), to some labour market institutions (such as unemploy-
ment bene￿ts for the young, minimum wages, etc.), to the role of the family at
providing income support (Bentolila and Ichino, 2000), and to the evolution of
the relative size of the youth population (Korenman and Neumark, 2000).
As for demographic shifts, there have been indeed quite intense changes in
the age composition of the labour force over the last three decades in OECD
countries. The Figures in Appendix C (at the end of the paper) illustrate these
changes by plotting the evolution of the youth population size (de￿ned as pro-
portion of the prime-aged population, that is, population aged 25-54, in the left
scale)3 together with the youth male and female unemployment rates and the un-
employment rate of prime aged men (25-54 years of age, in the right-scale). All
the countries in our sample experienced, ￿rst, an increase of the relative size of the
youth population up to the early 1970s and then a decline (with the exceptions
of Australia, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK where this variable
reached its peak in the early 1980s). Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics of
the ratio of population aged 15-24 to the population aged 25-54. The range of
variation over the sample of this variable is 11 percentage points. In Canada, The
Netherlands and the US, the range of variation is above 20 percentage points.
3This is also the de￿nition of relative size in Korenman and Neumark (2000). We choose
for comparability with their results. But there is an additional justi￿cation. The participation
rate of the population above 55 years age has been declining since the early 1980s in many
countries, mainly due to early retirement and Social Security provisions.
4Table 1. Relative size of youth population. Descriptive statistics
Period #obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
AUSTRALIA 1973-96 24 0.416 0.040 0.348 0.463
AUSTRIA 1988-94 7 0.342 0.036 0.293 0.392
BELGIUM 1983-96 14 0.344 0.036 0.293 0.398
CANADA 1973-96 24 0.419 0.084 0.298 0.518
DENMARK 1983-94 12 0.354 0.028 0.304 0.386
FINLAND 1979-96 18 0.325 0.040 0.279 0.391
FRANCE 1968-96 29 0.400 0.038 0.324 0.465
GERMANY 1968-94 27 0.355 0.042 0.261 0.406
IRELAND 1979-94 16 0.493 0.029 0.452 0.530
ITALY 1968-96 29 0.375 0.024 0.314 0.407
JAPAN 1973-96 24 0.338 0.025 0.302 0.393
NETHERLANDS 1972-96 26 0.399 0.059 0.277 0.483
NORWAY 1972-94 23 0.404 0.028 0.330 0.431
NEW ZEALAND 1986-96 11 0.428 0.034 0.376 0.481
PORTUGAL 1974-94 21 0.446 0.021 0.414 0.477
SPAIN 1972-96 25 0.431 0.017 0.388 0.450
SWEDEN 1979-96 18 0.335 0.022 0.292 0.354
UK 1970-96 27 0.386 0.042 0.296 0.435
USA 1968-96 29 0.439 0.079 0.313 0.524
As for youth unemployment, there are noticeable cross-country diﬀerences
in prime age male unemployment rates, with the gap varying by gender, across
countries, and across time. In most countries there is an increasing trend in
youth unemployment rates (the exceptions being the US and, since the mid-
1980s, Denmark, Ireland, The Netherlands and the UK). Youth unemployment
rates have been particularly high in Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, and Spain,
with a signi￿c a n tp o s i t i v eg a pb e t w e e nm e na n dw o m e ni nt h ec a s eo ft h el a s t
two countries, and to a lesser extent, in France. Table 2 reports some descriptive
statistics of unemployment rates of the three population groups considered (men
15-24, women 15-24 and men 25-54)
5Table 2. Unemployment rates.
Some descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Men, 15-24 0.132 0.047 0.031 0.208
Australia Women, 15-24 0.129 0.033 0.036 0.180
Men, 25-54 0.049 0.023 0.008 0.089
Men, 15-24 0.055 0.007 0.046 0.066
Austria Women, 15-24 0.055 0.003 0.051 0.058
Men, 25-54 0.054 0.007 0.045 0.065
Men, 15-24 0.157 0.038 0.101 0.205
Belgium Women, 15-24 0.236 0.049 0.152 0.303
Men, 25-54 0.056 0.010 0.040 0.066
Men, 15-24 0.159 0.033 0.108 0.222
Canada Women, 15-24 0.130 0.022 0.081 0.168
Men, 25-54 0.071 0.022 0.040 0.107
Men, 15-24 0.111 0.030 0.070 0.181
Denmark Women, 15-24 0.126 0.030 0.090 0.197
Men, 25-54 0.067 0.017 0.040 0.101
Men, 15-24 0.165 0.109 0.074 0.371
Finland Women, 15-24 0.145 0.086 0.073 0.307
Men, 25-54 0.069 0.045 0.023 0.159
Men, 15-24 0.123 0.073 0.026 0.242
France Women, 15-24 0.197 0.100 0.039 0.322
Men, 25-54 0.044 0.028 0.008 0.097
Men, 15-24 0.048 0.033 0.001 0.104
Germany Women, 15-24 0.060 0.034 0.004 0.117
Men, 25-54 0.035 0.024 0.002 0.066
Men, 15-24 0.225 0.054 0.100 0.295
Ireland Women, 15-24 0.177 0.045 0.081 0.232
Men, 25-54 0.133 0.029 0.066 0.178
Men, 15-24 0.215 0.073 0.099 0.298
Italy Women, 15-24 0.288 0.122 0.103 0.422
Men, 25-54 0.032 0.018 0.014 0.072
6Table 2. Unemployment rates.
(continued)
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Men, 15-24 0.045 0.010 0.025 0.068
Japan Women, 15-24 0.041 0.012 0.022 0.067
Men, 25-54 0.017 0.004 0.010 0.025
Men, 15-24 0.116 0.066 0.020 0.266
Netherlands Women, 15-24 0.112 0.067 0.008 0.241
Men, 25-54 0.052 0.031 0.012 0.122
Men, 15-24 0.077 0.037 0.038 0.150
Norway Women, 15-24 0.083 0.025 0.049 0.132
Men, 25-54 0.021 0.018 0.004 0.057
Men, 15-24 0.142 0.043 0.079 0.206
New Zealand Women, 15-24 0.125 0.032 0.076 0.168
Men, 25-54 0.058 0.023 0.023 0.088
Men, 15-24 0.099 0.029 0.033 0.140
Portugal Women, 15-24 0.194 0.068 0.051 0.282
Men, 25-54 0.030 0.011 0.006 0.051
Men, 15-24 0.245 0.115 0.046 0.393
Spain Women, 15-24 0.336 0.170 0.028 0.510
Men, 25-54 0.095 0.049 0.015 0.164
Men, 15-24 0.113 0.082 0.039 0.277
Sweden Women, 15-24 0.102 0.061 0.038 0.220
Men, 25-54 0.037 0.032 0.011 0.096
Men, 15-24 0.145 0.063 0.036 0.263
UK Women, 15-24 0.109 0.052 0.017 0.198
Men, 25-54 0.067 0.029 0.022 0.110
Men, 15-24 0.126 0.029 0.062 0.191
USA Women, 15-24 0.124 0.017 0.091 0.162
Men, 25-54 0.046 0.016 0.016 0.082
The relevance of demographic changes at explaining youth unemployment is
somewhat controversial. Korenman and Neumark (2000), using pooled cross-
country data for some OECD countries, estimate the elasticity of the youth un-
employment rate with respect to the youth cohort size to be around 0.5. Shimer
(2001) challenges this result showing that across US states a higher share of the
youth population decreases unemployment. Ahn, Izquierdo, and Jimeno (2000)
￿nd that, across Spanish regions, there seems to be a close positive relation-
ship between the relative size of the youth population and youth unemployment.
Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2002) show that demographic shocks (i.e., changes in
the youth population share) interacted with labour market institutions contribute
7to explaining the diﬀerence in the aggregate unemployment rate and in the rel-
ative employment rates of young and female workers between the US and some
EU countries.
In this paper we jointly estimate the relevance of demographic and institu-
tional variables at explaining cross-country diﬀerences in youth unemployment
rates. For this estimation, we construct a data set with gender and age speci￿c
unemployment rates, the relative size of youth population, and labour market
institutions with information on 19 countries (the EU countries -excluding Lux-
embourg and Greece-, Norway, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan)
over the 1968-1996 period.4
Before turning to the empirical analysis we present a theoretical framework
to rationalise the relationship between the age composition of the labour force
and labour market institutions, on the one hand, and the incidence of unemploy-
ment across diﬀerent population age groups, on the other. The main assumption
is that workers of diﬀerent ages are not perfectly substitutes, so that, if some
labour market institutions preclude the complete adjustment of relative wages,
changes in the relative labour supply of workers of diﬀerent ages will show up in
diﬀerent age speci￿c unemployment rates. Thus, while in ￿exible labour markets
(say, for instance, in the US) changes in the composition of the labour force would
lead to changes in wage inequality, in countries in which labour market ￿rigidi-
ties￿ (e.g. minimum wages and other regulations with diﬀerentiated impacts on
workers of diﬀerent ages) keep wages above the clearing levels, we should expect
a positive relationship between the relative size of youth population and youth
unemployment. This conjecture is supported by the results in Bertola, Blau
and Kahn (2002). Comparing the US and European experiences they identify
some labour market institutions and the demographic evolutions that contribute
to explaining both the low unemployment rate and the high wage inequality of
the US relative to other OECD countries. However, it is plausible that both in
￿￿exible￿ and ￿rigid￿ labour markets, relative wages adjust over the long-run,
so that we should expect to observe a higher eﬀect of demographics variables on
unemployment diﬀerential on high frequency data than on low frequency data.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a simple
theoretical framework illustrating the relationship between the relative size of a
given population group, relative wages and unemployment. Section 3 reports the
relationship between youth unemployment and the relative size of youth popula-
tion in our data set. Section 4 contains the main bulk of our empirical exercise,
namely, the estimation of the relative importance of demographic shifts, institu-
tional factors, and macroeconomic shocks at explaining the evolution of youth
unemployment. For the estimation we use both annual data and ￿ve-year period
averages to assess how long is the long run over which relative wages are supposed
4See Appendix A for the coverage of the sample and the de￿nition of variables.
8to adjust to demographic variables. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Labour input, production and labour demand
In order to obtain a certain relationship between the age composition of the
labour force and youth unemployment, the possibility of imperfect substitution
between workers of diﬀerent ages is introduced. Thus, let us assume that there
are two ￿types￿ of workers, ￿young workers￿ (denoted by the subscript 1)a n d
￿adult workers￿ (denoted by the subscript 2) ,w h o s er e l a t i v ep r o d u c t i v i t yi sg i v e n
by δ. Total labour input is a function of the two ￿types￿ of labour with a constant
elasticity of substitution, i.e.,
N =[ N
ρ
1 + δN
ρ
2]
1/ρ 1 ≥ ρ ≥ 0
while the production function is given by
Y =[ N
ρ
1 + δN
ρ
2]
α/ρ 1 ≥ α > 0
being α the degree of returns to labour. Firms produce to meet a constant
elasticity demand curve, Y = P−θ, θ > 1.T h e￿rst-order condition of the cost
minimization problem gives:
MRS = δ
￿
N1
N2
¶ 1
σ
⇒
N1
N2
=
￿
w2
δw1
¶σ
(1)
being σ = 1
1−ρ > 1 the elasticity of substitution. Hence, the relative demand
of young workers with respect to adult workers is decreasing in their relative
unit labour costs, and the corresponding elasticity is given by the elasticity of
substitution. This condition can be easily converted in labour demand curves for
each worker type, which are given by:
N1 =( αk)
1
1−αk w
λw
−σ
1 (2)
N2 =( αk)
1
1−αkw
λ
‡w2
δ
·−σ
(3)
being k =1− 1
θ < 1, a measure of the degree of competition in the product
market, w =
£
δ
σw
1−σ
2 + w
1−σ
1
⁄ 1
1−σ the aggregate wage index, and λ = σ − 1
1−αk.
Condition (1) yields a relationship between relative unemployment, relative
labour supply and relative wages. Let L1 and L2 be the labour supply of ￿young￿
and ￿adult￿ workers, respectively, so that u1 = L1−N1
L1 and u2 = L2−N2
L2 are the
9unemployment rates of ￿young￿ and ￿adult￿ workers, respectively. Taking loga-
rithms in equation (1) and using the approximation ln(1 − u) ≈− u =l nN−lnL,
gives
u1 − u2 =l n L1 − lnL2 − (lnN1 − lnN2)= (4)
= σ lnδ + σ(lnw1 − lnw2)+l nL1 − lnL2
Hence, the relative unemployment rate is determined by three factors: i) the
relative eﬃciency of adult workers with respect to young workers, ii) relative
wages, and iii) relative labour supply. Relative labor supply is determined by
demographic evolutions. Relative eﬃciency is related to diﬀerences in eﬃciency
across cohorts and, therefore, may depend upon technology requirements and
the characteristics of educational systems. Finally, relative wages are aﬀected
by labor market institutions, such as minimum wages, employment protection
legislation, unemployment bene￿ts, etc. We now specify how relative wages are
determined.
2.2 Wage determination
Under perfect competition relative wages adjust to clear the market. Under this
institutional framework the reading of equation (4) is that there are exogenously
given ￿full employment￿ unemployment rates for each group of the population
(not necessarily equal across cohorts), and, hence, given the relative eﬃciency of
adult workers and the elasticity of substitution, equation (4) yields a relationship
between relative wages and relative labour supply. We consider an alternative
institutional scenario in which wages are determined by collective bargaining
between employers and workers. ￿Young￿ and ￿adult￿ workers have diﬀerent
reservation wages (w1 and w2, respectively) and diﬀerent bargaining power (β1
and β2, respectively). Let Π be the ￿rm￿s pro￿t function. Wages are determined
by the following Nash maximization problem:
max
w1,w2
[(w1 − w1)N1]
β1 [(w2 − w2)N2]
β2 Π
subject to : N1 =( αk)
1
1−αk w
λw
−σ
1 ,N 2 =( αk)
1
1−αkw
λ
‡w2
δ
·−σ
The ￿rst-order conditions can be expressed as:
β1
w1 − w1
−
β1σ
w1
=
￿
αk
1 − αk
−
λ(β1 + β2)
w
¶‡w1
w
·−σ
and
10β2
w2 − w2
−
β2σ
w2
=
￿
αk
1 − αk
−
λ(β1 + β2)
w
¶‡w2
δw
·−σ
where w =
£
ϕlnw
1−σ
1 +( 1− ϕ)w
1−σ
2
⁄ 1
1−σ is the aggregate workers￿ reservation
wage (de￿ned as the aggregate wage index corresponding to the reservation wages
of each worker￿s type, being. ϕ the weight which depends upon relative supplies,
ϕ = L1
L1+L2). These two conditions yield
w1
w1 − w1
− σ = γδ
−σ
￿
w2
w2 − w2
− σ
¶￿
w1
w2
¶1−σ
(5)
where γ ≡
β2
β1 is the bargaining power of adult workers relative to the bargaining
power of ￿young￿ workers.
The following particular case may be illustrative. Under a unit elasticity
of substitution (Cobb-Douglas labour input function), the relative mark-up of
wages over reservation wages of adult workers respect to younger ones is given
j u s tb yt h er a t i oo ft h er e l a t i v eb a r g a i n i n gp o w e ra n dt h er e l a t i v ee ﬃciency of
adult workers:
w1
w1 − w1
− 1=
γ
δ
￿
w2
w2 − w2
− 1
¶
=⇒
w2 − w2
w1 − w1
=
γ
δ
w2
w1
More generally, a number of results can be drawn from the model:
Proposition 1 Let w2 (w1) be the function of w1 implicitly de￿ned by (5). w2 (w1)
is the contract curve of older and young workers. Under γ > 1 and w2 ≥ w1 > 0,
it follows that:
1. w2 (w1) is increasing and concave. Moreover, w2 (w1) >w 1.
2. An increase in relative bargaining power of older workers, γ, increases the
relative wage of older workers w2/w1.
3. An increase in the relative eﬃciency of younger workers, δ, decreases the
relative wage of older workers, w2/w1.
4. An increase in the aggregate wage w decreases the relative wage of older
workers, w2/w1.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Claims 1 and 2 are illustrated in Figure 1. The pairs of wages (w2,w 1) that
satisfy (5) (and which are always above the diagonal) is the increasing but concave
11Figure 1: Eﬀect of increase in youth relative bargaining power
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function in Figures 1 and 2. Increases in older workers relative bargaining power γ
shifts this function upwards, particularly so for low values of w1. Note in particular
that a rise in γ not only increases the relative wage, but also decreases the youth
wage w1.
Claim 4 is similarly illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the eﬀects of an
increase in aggregate wages (resulting for example from an increase in aggregate
labor demand or the aggregate reservation wage). An increase in the aggregate
wage increases of course wages of both types of workers. But it also has an eﬀect
on wage inequality between young and older workers, which is reduced upon an
increase in labor demand (as at the new equilibrium the contract curve is closer
to the diagonal).
The combination of the results for relative wages in the Proposition and the
relative unemployment rates equation (4) capture the links that go from labor
market institutions (indexed by γ) and aggregate shocks (that aﬀect labor de-
mand), to the relative unemployment rate (u1 − u2). Speci￿cally, these variables
are mainly related by the relative age-speci￿cr e n t :( w2−w2)/(w1−w1). In partic-
ular, since job tenure and longer work histories (which correlate with age) aﬀect
the bargaining power in a number of institutional contexts,5 it seems natural to
regard age as a variable correlated with bargaining power at wage setting.
5A number of labor market institution tend to favour the situation of older workers relatively
to that of a recent entrant in the labour market. For example, in some countries unemployment
bene￿ts are only available to those losing an existing job, so that unemployed without a previous
employment spells are not eligible. Also, ￿ring costs typically increase with tenure.
12Figure 2: Eﬀect of increase in aggregate wages
1
1 wages of young workers
w
a
g
e
s
 
o
f
 
p
r
i
m
e
 
a
g
e
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
w2 = w1
Possibilities 
frontier
Contract 
curve
Possibilities frontier after increase 
in aggregate wages
As shown in Figure 1, the model implies in particular that institutional factors
that increase adult workers￿ relative bargaining power, γ, increase the relative
wage w2/w1 and therefore the relative labour market rent (w2 − w2)/(w1 − w1).
The eﬀect of an increase in the relative wage of adult workers, in turn, makes
young workers more attractive as hires, and the unemployment rate of the young
decreases relative to that of the insiders, as equation (4) indicates.
Regarding the eﬀects of aggregate shocks, as shown in Figure 2, shocks that
increase aggregate labor demand (like increases in TFP or decreases in real rates),
tend to decrease the relative wages of the older workers, therefore increasing
the relative unemployment rate of the young. This result suggests that if a
given institution (or shock) tends to increase the unemployment rate of the prime
age workers but decreases the relative unemployment rate of the young, this
institution could be generating, according to the model, relative rents to adult
workers. We examine some of these hypothesis in the empirical section.
3 Empirical analysis I: Demographic shifts and
relative youth unemployment
We start the empirical investigation of equation (4) above by estimating regres-
sions where the dependent variable is the unemployment rate diﬀerential (the
diﬀerence between the unemployment rate of the population aged 15-24 and the
unemployment rate of male workers aged 25-54) and the independent variable
is the relative size of youth population (de￿ned as the size of population aged
1315-24 over the population aged 25-54 in logarithms). Thus, the regression to be
estimated is:
u1524it − um2554it = ￿i + ￿t + β [ln(s1524)it − ln(s2554)it]+εit (6)
where u1524 is the unemployment rate of men (women) aged 15-24, um2554 is
the unemployment rate of men aged 25-54, s1524 is the relative size of population
aged 15-24, and s2554 is the relative size of population aged 25-54. We include
country and time speci￿c ￿xed eﬀects (￿i,￿ t) but also report results when either
time eﬀects, or ￿xed eﬀects or both are excluded from the regression. We run
diﬀerent regressions for men and women.
Results are reported in Table 3. The eﬀect of the relative size of youth pop-
ulation on the youth unemployment diﬀerential is (almost always) positive and
statistically signi￿cant. Overall, this eﬀect seems to be higher for women than
for men. Since it may seem too restrictive to impose a unit elasticity between
the youth unemployment and that of men aged 25-54 over the business cycle, we
also report the results from regressions where the (ln) unemployment rate of men
aged 25-54 is included as an additional independent variable, which it turns out
to be statistically signi￿cant in all speci￿cations. In these regressions the coef-
￿cients on the relative size of the youth population remain positive, statistically
signi￿cant, and within a same order of magnitude as in the regressions where
youth unemployment rates are restricted to move with the unemployment rate
of prime aged men one to one.
Overall the results are consistent with those obtained by Korenman and Neu-
mark (2000) from a sample of 15 OECD countries over the period 1970-1994.6
Moreover, the eﬀect of demographic shifts on youth unemployment is not negli-
gible. Being the coeﬃcient of the demographic variable around 0.15 (roughly the
average between the estimated coeﬃcients for men and women in the regressions
with country and time ￿xed eﬀects) and since the mean unemployment rate of
the population aged 15-24 in our sample is around 14%, the elasticity of the
youth unemployment rate with respect to the relative size of the young popula-
tion would be 1.07 and the observed variation of the latter would explain around
13% of youth unemployment and in the average country in our sample. A similar
calculation yields that the elasticity of the youth unemployment diﬀerential with
6Notice, however, that Korenman and Neumark (2000) use a log-log spec￿cation. Also, since
there may be an endogeneity problem due to workers moving to low unemployment-high wage
regions, some authors (Shimer, 2002, Korenman and Neumark, 2000, Bertola et al. 2002) use
past birth rates as instruments in this type of regressions. However, their OLS results and IV
results are not qualitatively diﬀerent. The information in our sample for most countries span the
period starting at the early 1970s, when international labour mobility became almost negligible.
Hence, we ￿nd it non-necessary to perform IV estimation, which, given data availability, would
require to exclude some countries from the sample and, hence, to reduce degrees of freedom,
needed for other estimations to be performed.
14respect to the relative size of the youth population is around 1.7 and that the
latter explains roughly 20% of the youth unemployment diﬀerentials observed in
our sample.
Table 3. Youth unemployment rate diﬀerentials
and demographic shifts.
Dependent variable: u1524 − um2554
(A) (B)
Men
Includes constant 0.022
(1.3)
0.019
(1.3)
Includes country ￿xed eﬀects −0.049
(3.0)
0.053
(5.2)
Includes time ￿xed eﬀects 0.111
(5.4)
0.044
(2.1)
Includes both country and time ￿xed eﬀects 0.111
(5.5)
0.068
(4.6)
Women
Includes constant 0.069
(2.4)
0.066
(2.4)
Includes country ￿xed eﬀects 0.005
(0.2)
0.123
(6.1)
Includes time ￿xed eﬀects 0.162
(4.6)
0.136
(3.5)
Includes both country and time ￿xed eﬀects 0.224
(7.6)
0.186
(6.8)
Notes: Unsigned t-statistics in parentheses. u1524:u n e m p l o y m e n tr a t e
of the population aged 15-24. um2554: unemployment rate of men aged 25-54
(A) Coeﬃcient on the (ln) relative youth population size. (B) Coeﬃcient on the
(ln) relative youth population size when the unemployment rate of men
aged 25-54 is included as an additional regressor.
4 Empirical analysis II: Demographic shifts, in-
stitutions, and interactions with shocks
We now turn to the analysis of the joint eﬀects of a larger set of factors aﬀect-
ing age-speci￿c unemployment rates. Our goals are twofold: i) to estimate the
diﬀerential eﬀects of demographic shifts, labour market institutions and macroe-
conomic shocks on the unemployment rates of three diﬀerent population groups:
men aged 15-24, women aged 15-24 and men aged 25-54, and ii) to assess the
extent to which the eﬀect of demographic shifts on youth unemployment rates
vanishes over the medium run.
15To achieve these goals we add to our data set the indicators of labour mar-
ket institutions often used and some measures of macroeconomic shocks, namely,
labour demand shifts, real interest rates and total factor productivity growth7.
The information of labour market institutions is as in Blanchard and Wolfers
(2000). It covers the unemployment bene￿ts system (replacement rate and du-
ration of bene￿ts), the extent of active labour market policies (an instrumented
measure of spending), wage determination (union density, union contract cover-
age, and the degree of coordination), the tax wedge, and the pervasiveness of
employment protection legislation (from a ranking of OECD countries).8 To this
set of institutional variables we add a measure of relative minimum wages (com-
puted on information from the OECD) and an indicator of the strictness of the
legislation regarding the use of temporary contracts, two institutions which we
expect to strongly in￿uence youth unemployment through its eﬀects on relative
wages and hiring rates. As for macroeconomic shocks, we use Blanchard and
Wolfers￿ (2000) measures of labour demand shifts, real interest rates, and total
factor productivity growth.
Before commenting on the results there are some caveats to be made. First,
when looking at the eﬀects of labour market institutions on aggregate unem-
ployment, it is reasonable to use medium-term averages to smooth out cyclical
￿uctuations in unemployment, even at the cost of reducing degrees of freedom
(which are already quite limited in the typically available panel data set of this
type). Given this restriction, when looking at the interactions of shocks and in-
stitutions, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and other papers using their data set
(for instance, Bertola, Blau, and Kahn, 2002) impose some speci￿cf o r mo ft h e
interaction terms. Since we are interested not only in the medium-run evolu-
tion of the relative youth unemployment rate but also in its cyclical behaviour
a n di t ss h o r t - r u nr e s p o n s et ot h er e l a t i v ep o p u l a t i o ns i z e ,w er u no u rr e g r e s s i o n s
with both annual data and ￿ve-year period averages as in Blanchard and Wolfers
(2000).
Secondly, the use of time invariant labour market institutions may be contro-
7Ideally, the analysis of the eﬀect of institutional variables on age and gender speci￿c un-
employment rates should include the role of age and gender speci￿c labour market wages and
rents, precisely as pointed out by the theoretical model above. Such data is available for some
countries for some years, mainly from countries￿ labour force surveys (implying in particular
that the information cannot be expected to be fully comparable across countries). Importantly,
t h ea v a i l a b i l i t yo fs u c he v i d e n c eo na g ea n dg e n d e rs p e c i ￿c wages clearly cannot match the cov-
erage of our panel in terms of time period and number of countries (which is re￿ected in Table
1 above). Therefore, imposing ourselves the inclusion of demographically disaggregated wage
data would imply a very considerable reduction on the ￿nal size of our data panel. Finally, the
exclusion of wage data has the non-negligible advantage of facilitating the comparison of our
results with the benchmark in Blanchard-Wolfers (2000). For all these reasons, we have cho-
sen to analyse econometrically the reduced-form link between institutions and macroeconomic
shocks to demographic unemployment performance.
8For a more detailed description of the variables, see Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
16versial. This implies that regressions including labour market institutions would
be equivalent to regressions with country ￿xed eﬀects. In other words, by choos-
ing time invariant labour market institutions we renounce to controlling country
￿xed eﬀects when estimating the impact of institutions on unemployment. Alter-
natively, we could have exploited changes in labour market institutions over the
last decades, as done, for instance, in Nunziata (2001). In order to facilitate the
comparability of our results with those of Blanchard-Wolfers (2000) for aggregate
unemployment rates, we have chosen to stick to the time-invariant measures of
institutional characteristics, leaving the analysis under time-varying institutional
measures for further work.
The third caveat refers to the functional form of the unemployment equation
to be estimated. Since our model is a labour demand model in which the equi-
librium is de￿ned in terms of relative employment rates, equation (4) links the
unemployment diﬀerential between young and adult workers (u1 − u2)a n dt h e
rest of demographic and institutional variables9.
Finally, it is becoming increasingly popular to use non-employment rates
rather than unemployment rates when assessing the causes of diﬀerent labour
market performance across countries. This is quite sensible since very often the
de￿nition of unemployment has some country-speci￿cc o m p o n e n t( l i k et h ev e r i ￿-
cation of job search which is required for a non-working individual to be classi￿ed
as unemployed) and the line between unemployed and non-participants in the
l a b o u rm a r k e t si sd i ﬃcult to draw. However, for our interest in this paper, the
use of youth employment rates would require to control for large changes occur-
ring in demand and supply of education which aﬀected participation of young
workers in the labour market.
Given these quali￿cations, we start by performing the estimation following
Blanchard and Wolfers￿ (2000) strategy of imposing a speci￿c form of interaction
between institutions and shocks. Tables 4 and 5 present the results regarding the
eﬀects of labour market institutions interacted with unobservable and observable
shocks, respectively, on the prime age male unemployment rate, and on youth
unemployment rates by gender, in levels, relative to the unemployment rate of
prime age men, and in terms of the unemployment rate diﬀerential. Each Table
has two panels reporting the results from estimation with annual data and with
￿ve-year averages.
The second column of Table 4a shows the eﬀects of labour market institutions
9Alternatively, one could think of models in which the labour market equilibrium is de￿ned
in terms of relative unemployment rates, instead of absolute diﬀerences in unemployment rates
(which are the focus of this paper). This would call for the estimation of unemployment
equations in which the dependent variable is the (ln) of the youth relative unemployment rate
(lnu1−lnu2). To avoid a rather lengthy set of results we report only the results from estimation
of the ￿rst speci￿cation. Results for relative unemployment rates are available from the authors
on request.
17on the unemployment rate of men aged 25-54 (um2554). Higher replacement
rates (Rrate), longer duration bene￿ts (Bene￿t ), stricter protection legislation
(EPL), higher union density (Udensity), a higher tax wedge (Twedge), and lower
coordination (Coord) all lead to higher unemployment of prime-age men, while
the coeﬃcients of expenditures on active labour market policies (Almp) and union
coverage (Ucoverage) are not statistically signi￿cant.10 With the exception of the
eﬀect of active labour market policies, these results are very much in line with the
results in Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) referred to the aggregate unemployment
rate from ￿ve-year averages, which are replicated here in the second column of
Table 4b. It turns out that when we estimate the equation with the observations
grouped in ￿ve-year averages (as in Blanchard and Wolfers￿ (2000)), the eﬀects of
labour market institutions on the prime age male unemployment are qualitatively
similar (see the third column in Table 4b), although standard errors are higher
by the signi￿cantly lower number of observations (i.e., 404 observations in the
regressions with annual data and 90 observations in the regressions with ￿ve-year
averages).
Table 4a. Institutions interacted with unobservable shocks
Annual data
um2554 u1524 u1524 − um2554
Men Men Women Men Women
Rrate 0.016
(4.6)
0.011
(3.5)
0.006
(1.8)
0.002
(0.4)
0.001
(0.3)
−0.12
(1.6)
Bene￿t 0.166
(3.6)
0.099
(2.5)
0.089
(2.0)
−0.013
(0.2)
0.080
(1.4)
−0.224
(2.2)
Ucoverage 0.013
(0.1)
0.466
(2.3)
0.120
(0.5)
0.780
(2.2)
−0.188
(0.6)
1.712
(3.1)
EPL 0.032
(3.6)
−0.028
(1.5)
0.023
(1.1)
0.127
(4.7)
0.077
(2.9)
0.195
(5.1)
ALMP −0.007
(0.8)
−0.006
(0.9)
0.001
(0.1)
0.017
(1.3)
0.003
(0.3)
0.052
(2.4)
Udensity 0.014
(2.7)
0.007
(1.5)
0.016
(3.1)
−0.013
(1.5)
0.024
(3.5)
−0.044
(3.0)
Twedge 0.022
(3.7)
0.023
(3.8)
0.046
(6.5)
0.054
(5.9)
0.064
(7.3)
0.073
(5.6)
Coord. 0.362
(5.7)
0.254
(3.8)
0.227
(3.1)
0.294
(2.6)
0.200
(2.1)
0.259
(1.6)
Ypop 1.251
(4.8)
1.062
(4.3)
0.258
(1.2)
0.858
(3.6)
0.941
(3.5)
Temp 1.683
(3.8)
0.502
(1.0)
1.200
(1.8)
−0.637
(1.0)
2.578
(2.4)
Rwmin 0.009
(0.5)
−0.033
(1.6)
−0.117
(3.8)
−0.077
(2.9)
−0.187
(4.2)
Adjusted R2 0.923 0.933 0.937 0.954 0.933 0.957
10The variables ALMP and Coord are de￿ned with a negative sign, so that increases in all
institutional variables are expected to increase unemployment.
18Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Regressions include country and time ￿xed eﬀects.
The rest of the columns in Tables 4a and 4b report the estimated eﬀects of
labour market institutions interacted with unobservable shocks on youth unem-
ployment rates (um1524, for men, and uf1524, for women) and on the diﬀerential
between youth unemployment rates and the unemployment rate of prime-aged
men (um1524−um2554 and uf1524−um2554, respectively). In these regressions
we also include the relative size of the youth population (Ypop,m e a s u r e da st h e
(log) ratio of the population aged 15-24 over the population aged 25-54) and two
additional labour market institutions: the degree of strictness of regulation of
temporary employment (Temp, taken from OECD, 1994) and the (log) ratio of
the minimum wage applying to young workers over the minimum wage applying
to prime-aged workers (Rwmin, also from OECD, 1994 ). In most countries this
ratio is equal to one, since there are not sub-minimum wages for young workers,
but it is below one in Australia (0.7), Belgium (0.9), France (0.8), Ireland (0.7)
Netherlands (0.8) and Portugal (0.8).
Table 4b. Institutions interacted with unobservable shocks
Five-year averages
u um2554 u1524 u1524 − um2554
Men Men Women Men Women
Rrate 0.017
(4.9)
0.010
(1.6)
0.005
(1.2)
0.001
(0.2)
0.002
(0.2)
−0.004
(0.5)
−0.005
(0.5)
Bene￿t 0.202
(4.7)
0.191
(2.1)
0.070
(1.1)
0.077
(1.1)
−0.002
(0.0)
0.101
(1.1)
−0.155
(1.1)
Ucoverage 0.101
(0.5)
0.023
(0.1)
0.450
(1.5)
0.118
(0.3)
0.563
(1.1)
−0.215
(0.5)
1.055
(1.5)
EPL 0.044
(3.0)
0.040
(1.4)
−0.042
(1.5)
0.007
(0.2)
0.113
(2.7)
0.069
(1.6)
0.165
(3.2)
ALMP 0.017
(2.9)
−0.014
(0.9)
−0.009
(1.1)
0.004
(0.3)
0.009
(0.5)
0.015
(1.0)
0.025
(1.1)
Udensity 0.008
(2.0)
0.005
(0.5)
0.002
(0.3)
0.012
(1.6)
−0.007
(0.6)
0.020
(2.0)
−0.020
(1.2)
Twedge 0.018
(3.1)
0.009
(0.8)
0.014
(1.5)
0.036
(3.2)
0.047
(3.2)
0.057
(4.0)
0.067
(3.6)
Coord. 0.299
(5.1)
0.315
(2.5)
0.196
(2.0)
0.139
(1.2)
0.253
(1.4)
0.064
(0.4)
0.241
(1.1)
Ypop. 2.028
(4.8)
1.614
(3.5)
0.530
(1.4)
1.083
(2.4)
0.602
(1.5)
Temp 0.032
(1.1)
−0.021
(0.6)
−0.100
(2.0)
−0.086
(1.9)
−0.157
(2.5)
Rwmin 1.383
(2.1)
0.333
(0.4)
0.472
(0.5)
−0.679
(0.7)
0.817
(0.6)
Adjusted R2 0.948 0.934 0.942 0.946 0.955 0.941 0.955
Notes: Unsigned statistics in parentheses. Regressions include country and time
19￿xed eﬀects. The estimates for the total unemployment rate are from Blanchard
and Wolfers (2000).
As for the eﬀects on the level of youth unemployment, we ￿nd some diﬀer-
ential eﬀects of the institutions on male and female youth unemployment rates.
Young men￿ unemployment rates are signi￿cantly increased by the duration of
unemployment bene￿ts, union density, the tax wedge and lower coordination.
For young women, unemployment rates are increased by higher levels in union
coverage, stricter employment protection legislation the tax wedge and by lower
coordination. Furthermore, the sixth and seventh columns in Table 4a show that
the youth unemployment diﬀerential increases with the strictness of employment
protection legislation (EPL), union density, tax wedge and decreases with co-
ordination, in the case of males. As for females, the diﬀerential increases with
u n i o nc o v e r a g es t r i c t n e s so fE P L ,t h et a xw e d g ea n dt h ed e g r e eo fs t r i c t n e s s
of temporary employment, and decreases with union density. When estimating
with ￿ve-year averages we ￿nd that youth unemployment diﬀerentials increase
with union density and the tax wedge, in the case of young men, and with the
strictness of EPL and the tax wedge, in the case of young women.
We also investigate the relevance of the interactions between labour market
institutions and some observable shocks at explaining cross-country diﬀerences in
aggregate and youth unemployment rates, as in Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
As for observable shocks we consider the demographic shifts (Yp o p ), measured
as the relative size of the population aged 15-24 over the population aged 25-54,
and:
1. Shifts in labour demand (LD shift).
2. Ex-post real interest rates (RIrate), and
3. Productivity growth (TFP).
Equations (4) and (5) are useful to illustrate why these shocks may have
ad i ﬀerent impact on the youth unemployment rate with respect to the unem-
ployment rate of prime aged men. First, shifts in labour demand translate into
lower employment if real wages do not adjust, and, even if these shifts are evenly
distributed across sectors and occupations, there are no reasons to expect that
the wages of youth workers respond similarly to the wages of adult workers,
particularly if collective bargaining, and concerns about wage compression, are
widespread. Secondly, productivity growth may aﬀect the relative eﬃciency of
￿young￿ versus ￿adult￿ workers (δ in Section 2). Higher productivity growth
may result in lower employment opportunities for young, unskilled workers, if
educational systems are not ￿exible enough to adjust for providing better pro-
fessional quali￿cations. Finally, higher ex-post real interest rates imply a higher
20cost of capital, and, hence, lower employment creation and, possibly, also higher
gross rates of employment destruction, aﬀecting most to capital intensive sectors.
Thus, higher real interest rates are likely to have diﬀerent eﬀects on prime-age
and younger, as workers diﬀerent ages tend not to be evenly distributed across
sector and occupations.
Tables 5a and 5b report the results from both annual data and ￿ve-year
averages regressions on the eﬀects of the interactions between labour market
institutions and observable shocks on unemployment rates of young and prime
age workers.
21Table 5a. Institutions interacted with observable shocks
Annual data
um2554 u1524 u1524 − um2554
Men Men Women Men Women
LD shift 0.342
(7.7)
0.315
(6.6)
0.773
(5.9)
0.699
(4.8)
0.462
(5.2)
0.016
(0.2)
RIrate 0.244
(4.8)
0.221
(4.5)
0.374
(3.0)
0.402
(3.3)
0.141
(1.9)
−0.000
(0.1)
TFP −0.172
(5.0)
−0.162
(4.7)
−0.281
(3.6)
−0.070
(0.8)
−0.112
(2.5)
0.002
(0.2)
Ypop −0.022
(1.6)
0.009
(0.3)
0.074
(2.0)
0.021
(1.0)
0.007
(0.2)
Rrate 0.002
(0.5)
−0.006
(0.9)
−0.001
(0.1)
−0.008
(0.6)
−0.009
(0.1)
−0.740
(0.2)
Bene￿t 0.178
(2.2)
0.157
(2.0)
0.280
(2.8)
0.350
(2.2)
0.379
(3.0)
−0.291
(0.2)
Ucoverage −0.326
(0.9)
0.177
(0.5)
−0.686
(1.2)
−0.061
(0.0)
−1.572
(2.1)
0.348
(0.2)
EPL −0.012
(0.5)
−0.019
(0.6)
0.017
(0.4)
0.041
(0.6)
0.069
(1.3)
0.361
(0.2)
ALMP −0.012
(0.8)
−0.021
(1.5)
−0.012
(0.7)
0.006
(0.2)
−0.006
(0.2)
0.315
(0.2)
Udensity 0.008
(1.0)
−0.001
(0.1)
0.019
(1.5)
−0.002
(0.1)
0.036
(2.2)
−0.713
(0.2)
Twedge 0.032
(3.0)
0.026
(1.9)
0.046
(2.3)
0.080
(2.1)
0.060
(2.1)
0.336
(0.2)
Coord. 0.091
(0.8)
0.007
(0.0)
0.086
(0.5)
0.090
(0.3)
0.102
(0.5)
0.171
(0.2)
Temp −0.045
(0.9)
−0.001
(0.0)
−0.080
(0.7)
0.027
(0.3)
0.020
(0.2)
Rwmin 1.473
(1.9)
0.136
(0.1)
1.941
(1.2)
−0.740
(0.6)
0.284
(0.2)
Adjusted R2 0.883 0.884 0.881 0.875 0.874 0.874
Notes: t-statistics (in absolute value) in parenthesis. Regressions include country and
time ￿xed eﬀects.
Both for prime aged men and young workers, the unemployment rate increases
with negative shifts in labour demand, the real interest rate, and TFP growth
in the regressions with annual data.11.T h e s e e ﬀects are larger for young men,
so that the diﬀerence between the unemployment rate of young men and that
of prime aged men increases with negative labour demand shifts, interest rates
and TFP growth in the short-run. Over ￿ve year periods, youth unemployment
diﬀerentials increase with the real interest rate and decreases with TFP growth,
while labour demand shifts become barely statistically signi￿cant. As for the
coeﬃcients on labour market institutions, in this speci￿cation the only variable
11TFP growth is multiplied by -1, so that a negative coeﬃcient implies unemployment in-
creasing with TFP growth.
22with a consistently positive eﬀect on the youth unemployment diﬀerential, both
with annual data and ￿ve-year averages, is the tax wedge. As for the demo-
graphic variable, in this speci￿cation we ￿nd much lower coeﬃcients, which are
statistically signi￿cant only in the case of women. While the results from estima-
tion with ￿ve-year averages are similar for labour demand shifts and real interest
rates, the coeﬃcient of TFP growth changes sign indicating a positive eﬀect of
TFP growth on unemployment. This is consistent with some macroeconomic
evidence from Structural VAR estimation which ￿nds that productivity growth
raises unemployment at high frequencies, while this eﬀect vanishes or become
negative at low frequencies (see, for instance, Gal￿, 1999)
Table 5b. Institutions interacted with observable shocks
Five-year averages
u um2554 u1524 u1524 − um2554
Men Men Women Men Women
LD shift 0.319
(2.5)
0.301
(3.6)
0.323
(3.6)
0.623
(2.7)
−0.135
(0.7)
0.273
(1.9)
−0.143
(1.0)
RIrate 0.470
(5.0)
0.383
(4.2)
0.395
(3.8)
0.828
(3.3)
0.765
(3.1)
0.429
(2.8)
0.587
(3.1)
TFP 0.730
(5.1)
0.155
(1.0)
0.147
(0.9)
0.665
(1.7)
1.951
(3.2)
0.556
(2.3)
1.536
(3.3)
Ypop 0.005
(0.2)
0.046
(0.8)
0.128
(2.3)
0.040
(1.1)
0.100
(2.3)
Rrate 0.026
(3.8)
−0.005
(0.6)
−0.005
(0.5)
−0.003
(0.2)
0.027
(1.2)
−0.002
(0.1)
0.022
(1.0)
Bene￿t 0.473
(5.1)
0.310
(2.6)
0.292
(2.4)
0.308
(1.9)
0.227
(0.7)
0.303
(1.5)
0.193
(0.6)
Ucoverage −0.453
(1.0)
−0.487
(0.9)
−0.090
(0.1)
−0.658
(0.7)
0.410
(0.2)
−1.263
(1.1)
0.085
(0.0)
EPL 0.404
(7.1)
0.002
(0.1)
−0.027
(0.5)
0.018
(0.3)
0.127
(0.8)
0.075
(0.9)
0.167
(1.0)
ALMP 0.030
(1.4)
−0.031
(1.4)
−0.036
(1.6)
−0.011
(0.3)
0.113
(1.7)
0.033
(0.7)
0.101
(1.7)
Udensity 0.033
(2.9)
0.007
(0.5)
0.001
(0.1)
0.020
(1.1)
−0.005
(0.2)
0.042
(1.6)
0.000
(0.0)
Twedge 0.034
(2.4)
0.026
(1.7)
0.010
(0.4)
0.046
(1.5)
0.083
(1.7)
0.092
(2.2)
0.087
(1.8)
Coord. 0.421
(2.9)
0.116
(0.6)
0.151
(0.6)
0.1713
(0.6)
0.392
(0.6)
0.144
(0.4)
0.284
(0.4)
Temp 0.029
(0.3)
0.010
(0.1)
−0.093
(0.6)
−0.035
(0.3)
−0.135
(0.8)
Rwmin 1.354
(1.1)
0.040
(0.0)
2.068
(0.6)
−1.327
(0.6)
1.548
(0.4)
Adjusted R2 0.671 0.896 0.894 0.890 0.880 0.884 0.867
Notes: t-statistics (in absolute value) in parenthesis. Regressions include country and
time ￿xed eﬀects. The estimates for the total unemployment rate are from Blanchard
and Wolfers (2000).
23Finally, to further examine the eﬀects of labour market institutions and
macroeconomic shocks on youth unemployment we estimate additional regres-
sions without imposing any speci￿c forms of interaction between both. Table 6
reports the results from linear regressions including labour market institutions,
macroeconomic shocks, the relative size of the youth population and time ￿xed
eﬀects. As for macroeconomic shocks, we continue ￿nding that TFP growth
increases the diﬀerence between the unemployment rate of young men and the
unemployment rate of adult males at the annual frequency. And the relative
size of youth population increases youth unemployment, with the corresponding
elasticity of the same order of magnitude both at annual and ￿ve year period
frequencies.
Table 6a. Shocks, Institutions, and Unemployment
Linear regressions. Annual data
um2554 u1524 u1524 − um2554
Men Men Women Men Women
LD Shift 0.147
(8.7)
0.179
(4.3)
0.018
(0.3)
0.032
(1.0)
−0.129
(2.5)
RIrate 0.004
(0.1)
−0.283
(2.0)
−0.343
(1.8)
−0.287
(2.7)
−0.347
(2.0)
TFP −0.189
(5.7)
−0.332
(4.1)
−0.170
(1.5)
−0.146
(2.4)
0.016
(0.2)
Ypop 0.045
(4.7)
0.161
(6.9)
0.270
(8.3)
0.116
(6.6)
0.225
(7.6)
Rrate 0.001
(9.6)
0.001
(2.2)
0.001
(1.7)
−0.001
(2.2)
−0.001
(1.3)
Bene￿t 0.005
(5.5)
−0.007
(3.2)
−0.014
(4.2)
−0.013
(7.2)
−0.019
(6.4)
Ucoverage −0.005
(1.0)
0.039
(3.2)
0.054
(3.2)
0.044
(4.8)
0.060
(3.9)
EPL 0.003
(6.3)
0.003
(2.7)
0.005
(3.3)
0.000
(0.2)
0.002
(1.6)
ALMP 0.001
(5.4)
0.002
(4.8)
0.002
(4.4)
0.001
(3.5)
0.001
(3.1)
Udensity 0.001
(7.8)
0.001
(4.7)
0.000
(0.2)
0.001
(2.0)
−0.001
(2.3)
Twedge 0.001
(1.9)
0.002
(5.1)
0.002
(4.4)
0.002
(5.8)
0.002
(4.3)
Coord 0.016
(10.1)
0.044
(11.5)
0.042
(7.8)
0.028
(9.8)
0.026
(5.3)
Temp −0.001
(2.9)
0.000
(0.4)
0.003
(1.9)
0.002
(2.0)
0.004
(3.1)
Rwmin −0.015
(1.3)
0.078
(2.7)
0.132
(3.3)
0.094
(4.3)
0.147
(4.0)
Adjusted R2 0.751 0.700 0.658 0.643 0.616
Notes: Unsigned t-statistics in parenthesis. Regressions include time ￿xed eﬀects.
24As regards the eﬀects of labour market institutions, higher replacement rates
and longer duration of unemployment bene￿ts decrease the youth unemployment
diﬀerential. This eﬀect of the generosity of unemployment bene￿ts on youth
unemployment diﬀerentials could be expected from the fact that in some EU
countries young unemployed workers without previous employment spells are
non-eligible for unemployment bene￿ts. That is, in this regard, these institutional
factors would be primarily related to wage formation by prime age workers and
only secondarily to wage developments of younger workers. This, together with
the fact that these workers are mutually substitutes, could explain the eﬀect
of unemployment bene￿ts on the relative unemployment rate. This precisely
corresponds to the intuition derived from the model laid out above.
Table 6b. Shocks, Institutions, and Unemployment
Linear regressions. Five-year averages
um2554 u1524 u1524 − um2554
Men Men Women Men Women
LD Shift 0.127
(4.1)
0.157
(2.0)
0.055
(0.5)
0.029
(0.5)
−0.072
(0.7)
RIrate 0.155
(1.2)
0.119
(0.4)
0.203
(0.4)
−0.036
(0.2)
0.048
(0.1)
TFP −0.407
(3.1)
−0.584
(1.7)
0.162
(0.3)
−0.177
(0.7)
0.569
(1.2)
Ypop 0.054
(3.0)
0.167
(3.7)
0.273
(4.0)
0.113
(3.3)
0.219
(3.6)
Rrate 0.001
(5.2)
0.001
(1.4)
0.001
(1.0)
−0.000
(0.9)
−0.000
(0.4)
Bene￿t 0.005
(2.8)
−0.007
(1.7)
−0.012
(1.8)
−0.012
(3.6)
−0.017
(2.8)
Ucoverage −0.000
(0.0)
0.042
(1.8)
0.047
(1.4)
0.042
(2.4)
0.047
(1.5)
EPL 0.002
(2.7)
0.002
(1.1)
0.006
(2.0)
0.000
(0.0)
0.004
(1.4)
ALMP 0.001
(2.5)
0.001
(2.2)
0.002
(2.2)
0.001
(1.6)
0.002
(1.8)
Udensity 0.001
(3.9)
0.001
(2.6)
0.001
(0.8)
0.001
(1.4)
−0.001
(0.3)
Twedge 0.001
(1.5)
0.002
(2.7)
0.003
(2.2)
0.002
(2.8)
0.002
(2.0)
Coord 0.016
(5.8)
0.044
(6.3)
0.042
(3.9)
0.028
(5.3)
0.026
(2.7)
Temp −0.001
(1.3)
0.001
(0.6)
0.003
(1.0)
0.002
(1.4)
0.004
(1.4)
Rwmin 0.009
(0.4)
0.112
(2.0)
0.131
(1.6)
0.103
(2.5)
0.122
(1.6)
Adjusted R2 0.763 0.700 0.624 0.630 0.580
Notes: Unsigned t-statistics in parenthesis. Regressions include time ￿xed eﬀects.
25Regarding the institutional variables related to wage determination, higher
incidence of unions and of collective bargaining increase the relative youth unem-
ployment rate and the youth unemployment diﬀerential, something which Kahn
(2000) also ￿nds in a panel of 15 OECD countries over the period 1985-94. As
unions compress wages, low productivity, unskilled, young workers are priced out
of employment. This is also con￿rmed by the positive eﬀect of relative statutory
minimum wages (Rwmin) on the youth unemployment diﬀerential.12 Moreover, a
similar relative wage eﬀect also appears through the tax wedge variable. Increases
in the tax wedge have the strongest impact on the employment opportunities of
workers at the bottom of the wage distribution, where restrictions from minimum
wage legislation are frequently binding. Hence, as the tax wedge rises, youth
unemployment rates ought to be expected to rise by more than prime age male
unemployment, as it is the case according to the corresponding coeﬃcients in
Tables 4 and 5. As for EPL and the strictness of regulation aﬀecting temporary
employment, the ranking measures included in the regression do not seem to
be associated with higher relative youth unemployment. As shown by Dolado,
Felgueroso, and Jimeno (2002), countries with stricter employment protection
legislation liberalised ￿atypical￿ employment contracts (temporary, ￿xed-term
contracts) to a larger extent, which have resulted in a higher hiring rates for
young workers. In fact, we ￿nd that the youth unemployment diﬀerential (in
some speci￿cations) is higher the stricter the regulation aﬀecting temporary em-
ployment, although admittedly the estimated coeﬃcients are not statistically
signi￿cant in all our speci￿cations.
Overall, we draw two main conclusions from the evidence presented in this
paper. First, wage-compressing institutions increase the youth unemployment
diﬀerential, in the spirit of the model in Section 2. Secondly, there is a large
and signi￿cant eﬀe c to ft h er e l a t i v es i z eo ft h ey o u t hp o p u l a t i o nb o t ho ny o u t h
unemployment rates and youth unemployment diﬀerentials with respect to the
unemployment rate of prime age men. In this case, this eﬀect seems to be of
a similar order of magnitude in the short-run (annual data) and in the medium
run (￿ve-year period), suggesting that the eﬀects of demographic shifts on youth
unemployment diﬀerentials are not short-lived and that relative wages by age
take time to adjust.
5 Concluding remarks
In recent work Korenman and Neumark (2000) explain cross-country diﬀerences
in youth unemployment rates by demographic shifts causing ￿uctuations in the
relative size of the youth population. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) explain
12The measure of relative minimum wages is the ratio of young minimum wages to adult
minimum wages as provided by OECD.
26cross-country diﬀerences in aggregate unemployment rates by appealing to diﬀer-
ent labour market institutions, the diﬀerent incidence of macroeconomic shocks,
and the interaction between both. In this paper we have combined all these
factors (demographic, institutional, and macroeconomic) to gauge their relative
relevance at explaining cross-country diﬀerences in relative youth unemployment
rates. Our data set is a non-balanced panel of 19 OECD countries over the 1960-
1996 period. We perform estimation on a extensive number of speci￿cations
involving demographic, institutional and macroeconomic variables. Our results
show that: i) the relative size of the youth population is a non-negligible factor at
explaining cross-country diﬀerences in youth unemployment, ii) labour market in-
stitutions and macroeconomic shocks have had diﬀerential eﬀects on age-speci￿c
unemployment rates, and iii) ￿more￿ rigid labour markets imply higher relative
youth unemployment rates. We rationalise these results as the composition of
imperfect substitution of workers of diﬀerent ages in production and imperfect
competition in the labour market delivering less than full adjustment of relative
wages to relative supply.
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29Appendix A: Data sources.
Our data set is constructed from three sources of information:
1. EUROSTAT (for EU countries) and UN Population Statistics Yearbook give
annual information on the composition of population by ages and gender.
For the US we took the information provided in the web page of the US
Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.bls.org)
2. Data on age-speci￿c unemployment and employment rates are from the
OECD Labour Force Statistics.
3. Data on labour market institutions and macroeconomics shocks are from
Blanchard and Wolfers￿ (2000) data set.
The following table gives the countries, period and number of observations
included in our sample.
Table A1. Sample composition
Country Period No obs.
Australia 1973-96 24
Austria 1988-94 7
Belgium 1983-96 14
Canada 1973-96 24
Denmark 1983-94 12
Finland 1979-96 18
France 1968-96 29
Germany 1968-94 27
Ireland 1979-94 16
Italy 1968-96 29
Japan 1973-96 24
Netherlands 1971-96 26
Norway 1972-94 23
New Zealand 1986-96 11
Portugal 1974-94 21
Spain 1972-96 25
Sweden 1979-96 18
UK 1970-96 27
USA 1968-96 29
30Appendix B: Proof of proposition 1
Equation (5) in the text is:
w1
w1 − w1
−σ = γδ
−σ
￿
w2
w2 − w2
− σ
¶￿
w1
w2
¶1−σ
From the ￿rst order conditions of the bargaining problem it follows that for s =1 ,2:
ws
ws−ws − σ > 0, since the associated shadow variable is positive. Moreover, this
equation can be rewritten as:
h(w1,w1)
h(w2,w2)
= γδ
−σ (7)
where h(ws,ws) ≡
‡
ws
ws−ws − σ
·
wσ−1
s , which implicitly de￿nes w2 (w1). It is easy to
show (using the previous inequality) that ∂h/∂ws < 0,∂h/∂ws > 0,∂h2/∂w2
s > 0
and ∂h3/∂w3
s > 0.
To see for instance the ￿rst partial derivative, notice:
∂h
∂ws
=
∂
∂ws
￿￿
ws
ws − ws
− σ
¶
w
σ−1
s
¶
= −
ws
(ws − ws)
2 +( σ − 1)
￿
1
ws − ws
−
σ
ws
¶
Moreover, since ws − ws > 0,
sign
￿
−
ws
(ws − ws)
2 +( σ − 1)
1
ws
￿
ws
ws − ws
− σ
¶¶
=
= sign
￿
−
ws
ws − ws
+( σ − 1)
￿
1 − σ
ws − ws
ws
¶¶
The latter expression is bounded above:
⇒−
ws
ws − ws
+( σ − 1)
￿
1 − σ
ws − ws
ws
¶
< −σ +( σ − 1)
￿
1 − σ
ws − ws
ws
¶
and since σ > 1:
= −σ + σ − σ
2ws − ws
ws
− 1+σ
ws − ws
ws
< 0
so that the partial derivative is negative in the relevant range.
From this, and since w2 > w1 and γδ
−σ > 1, it is immediate that w2 >w 1.
31With these results it then follows that:
dw2
dw1
= −
∂h/∂w1 ¡
−γδ
−σ¢
∂h/∂w2
> 0
d2w2
dw2
1
=
∂2h/∂w2
1 • ∂h/∂w2 − ∂2h/∂w2
2 • ∂h/∂w1
¡
γδ
−σ • ∂h/∂w2
¢2 < 0
which proves claim 1. Claim 4 follows from this and the fact that aggregate wage
increases shift the restriction away from the origin in the (w2,w 1) space. Finally,
C l a i m s2a n d3f o l l o wf r o m( 7 ) .¥
32Appendix C: Proportion of youth population and group-
speci￿c unemployment rates in sample of countries.
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Denmark
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Finland
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